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Abstract
This paper investigates the simultaneous-move games in a mixed duopoly where firms are
maximizers of either profits or relative profits. Contrary to previous results, if each firm has
mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, a private firm monopolizes
whereas the public firm produces nothing.
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There has recently been much interest in a mixed oligopoly that analyze the competitive
relationship between public and private ﬁrms. In reality, many public ﬁrms are placed in
a situation where they have to compete against private ﬁrms. In many countries, there
are competitive relationships between the public and private ﬁrms. Analyses on typical
public ﬁrms only are conducted essentially within the paradigm of a monopoly where the
public ﬁrm and the private ﬁrm operate as a monopolist ignoring strategic interactions
among themselves.
In pioneering work of the mixed oligopoply, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) made an
important study on mixed oligopoly as a game theory. In particular, De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) investigate the objective function and payoﬀ patterns of the public ﬁrm as it is
privatized in view of social welfare. In some cases a public ﬁrm should be privatized
and maximize proﬁts rather than social welfare. They also found that there exists a
critical number of private ﬁrms such that privatization of the public ﬁrm improves social
welfare. Thanks to the analysis by De Fraja and Delbono(1989), the analyses of the mixed
oligopoly are actively tackled from various angles, such as private ﬁrms’ endogenous and
exogenous market entry, product diﬀerentiation between public and private ﬁrms, partial
privatization, under capacity of public ﬁrms and excess capacity of private ﬁrms1.
However, one of the most fundamental assumptions in mixed oligopoly is that all ﬁrms
maximize absolute proﬁts. From the viewpoint of mixed motives about proﬁts, Schaﬀer
(1989) and Vega-Redondo (1997) analyzed the relative payoﬀ in terms of the ﬁrms’ level as
they examine Cournot equilibrium in the evolutionary game theory. According to Schaﬀer
(1989) and Vega-Redondo(1997), a unilateral deviation from Cournot equilibrium that
decreases the proﬁt of deviator, but decrease the other ﬁrms’ proﬁt even more. Schaﬀer
(1989) and Vega-Redondo (1997) argued that instability of Cournot equilibrium in the
viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory as well as demonstrated that a Walrasian
equilibrium forms as an evolutionary consequence resulting from the process where every
ﬁrm tries to be ahead of every other one. According to Alos-Ferrer (2004), Riechmann
(2002, 2006) and Schipper (2005), in case where ﬁrms aiming to maximize relative payoﬀs
to win competitors and ﬁrms aiming to maximize absolute payoﬀ coexist, the amount of
production falls into the range between Cournot equilibrium and Walrasian equilibrium.
That is, if ﬁrms do not care about their inﬂuence on the market price and behavior as
price-taker, the equilibrium outputs result in Walrasian competitive market2.
Although some theoretical works have already succeeded in explaining a mixed oligopoly,
1For pioneering work, see Beato and Mas-Collel (1984). For excellent surveys, see De Fraja and Del-
bono (1990), Nett (1993) and Bos (1991). For recent literature on mixed oligopoly, see Matsumura(1998),
Matsumura and Matsushima (2003, 2004), Lu and Poddar (2005), Ogawa(2006), among others.
2In other words, if the relative payoﬀ is the measure, it pays to hurt in terms of absolute payoﬀ as
long as by hurting yourself you hurt your opponent even more. This class of game called “spite eﬀect”
in Riechmann (2002).
1this study adds mixed behavioral motives on the payoﬀ for a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm
in simultaneous-move game. We focus on the mixed situations in which each ﬁrm aims
to maximize its absolute payoﬀ and attempts to maximize relative payoﬀ which deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between ﬁrm’s absolute payoﬀ and average absolute payoﬀ of all ﬁrms.
2 The Model
Consider a mixed duopoly model with a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm, all producing a
single homogenous product with inverse demand given by
p = 1 − Q where Q = q0 + q1
where p is a price for two ﬁrms (i = 0,1), q0 and q1 denote the output of public ﬁrm and
private ﬁrm, respectively. The price can not be equal to 1−Q for all values of Q, for then
it would be negative for 1 < Q. Assume that total cost to ﬁrm i of producing quantity qi
is C(qi) = cqi. Assume that 1 > c > 0, so that there is some value for total output Q for
which market price is greater than the ﬁrms’ common marginal cost c. That is, there is
no ﬁxed costs and common marginal cost is constant3.
The absolute payoﬀ of each ﬁrm i is given by
π
a
i = p(qi − c). (1)
Relative payoﬀ to ﬁrm i is deﬁned in the evolutionary game theory (Samuelson(1997,
pp. 66) and Weibull(1995, pp. 71-74)) as the diﬀerence between i’s absolute payoﬀ and
the average absolute payoﬀ of all ﬁrms. The average absolute payoﬀ is given by (1/2)πa
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[p(qi − c) − p(qj − c)]. (2)
To distinguish notations, the superscript a and r are deﬁned as the absolute-payoﬀ-
maximizer and relative-payoﬀ-maximizer, respectively. Thus, the public ﬁrm 0 maximizes









1 where l = a,r,m = a,r (3)
where Q2/2 is the consumer surplus and πm
1 is the proﬁt of private ﬁrm.
3To simplify the analysis, cost function is the same for both private and public ﬁrm in our paper.
Thus, we rule out the possibility that privatization of the public ﬁrm reduces production cost. It turns
out that it is impossible for political or economics reasons to nationalize the public ﬁrm. There are
theoretical and empirical works for the equality of cost eﬃciency between the public ﬁrm and private
ﬁrm, see Matsumura and Kanda (2005) for appropriate references. In the literature, the public ﬁrm is
assumed to be less eﬃcient than the private ﬁrm, e.g. Pal (1998).
4In the case of n ﬁrms, the relative payoﬀ to ﬁrm i will be deﬁned πr




We consider ﬁrms’ choice of quantity in the following four cases.
[Absolute payoﬀ in mixed duopoly]: Following standard equilibrium concept,
the public ﬁrm’s absolute payoﬀ objective is to maximize welfare deﬁned as the sum of
consumer surplus and proﬁt all ﬁrms, and the private ﬁrm’s absolute payoﬀ objective is

















1 = (1 − q0 − q1)(q1 − c).
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[Relative payoﬀ in mixed duopoly]: Similarly, the maximization problems for
the relative-payoﬀ-maximizer of public ﬁrm and private ﬁrm, and private ﬁrm’s objective





















respectively. Given the relative-payoﬀ-maximizer, the private ﬁrm maximizes (8) with









< 0 ⇔ q0 = −q1.
Hence we obtain the equilibrium output levels as
q
∗







Notice that if both private and public ﬁrm are relative-payoﬀ-maximizer in simultaneous-
move game where welfare-maximizer public ﬁrm competes against the private ﬁrm, the
private ﬁrm who is relative-payoﬀ-maximizer can achieve the monopolistic position be-
cause the public ﬁrm’s output becomes zero. Thus, in the point of public ﬁrm’s view,
welfare-maximizer public ﬁrm prefers absolute payoﬀ function to relative payoﬀ function.
Thus, we will examine a case where mixed payoﬀ motives exist for this reason.
[Mixed motives of payoﬀ in mixed duopoly]: In this case, given the private ﬁrm
aims to maximize absolute(resp. relative) payoﬀ and the public ﬁrm aims to maximize






























< 0 ⇔ c < 1, (14)
respectively. Given the assumption, 1 > c in basic model, we can verify that both
∂W ar/∂q0 and ∂W ra/∂q0 are negative. Consequently, at any given pair of relative-payoﬀ-
maximizers and absolute-payoﬀ-maximizer of public ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm does not produce
the output. There would be no output for the public ﬁrm at which the public ﬁrm could
make any proﬁt, because the market price never exceeds 1.







The private ﬁrm wants to produce monopoly output whether there is absolute payoﬀ
function or relative payoﬀ function in simultaneous-move game.
43.1 Implication for Simultaneous-move Game in Mixed Duopoly
We have analyzed four cases in a simultaneous-move game. The result shows that if the
public ﬁrm aims to maximize the absolute payoﬀ, the private ﬁrm will produce less than
when it aims to maximize the absolute payoﬀ (see Equation (6) and (7)). Therefore, if
the public ﬁrm attempts to maximize the absolute payoﬀ, the private ﬁrm would not have
an incentive to maximize the absolute payoﬀ. In other cases, the public ﬁrm’s production
becomes zero, allowing the private ﬁrm’s monopoly payoﬀ and price set. In the case
where each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ motives is mixed, the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an
ineﬃcient level with the monopoly of private ﬁrm even if the public ﬁrm participates in
the productive activity. Therefore, the market price equals to the marginal cost of private
ﬁrm, and public ﬁrm does not produce any positive output where the mixed payoﬀ motives
exist in the simultaneous-move game of a mixed oligopoly. The existence of the pubic
ﬁrm never aﬀects the equilibrium output in the simultaneous-move games discussed in
mixed motives.
Alos-Ferrer (2004), Reichmann (2002, 2006) and Schipper (2005) focused on only the
private ﬁrms in the simultaneous-move game. They argued that a private ﬁrm that values
relative payoﬀ would not have an incentive to maximize the absolute payoﬀ, whereas a
private ﬁrm that values the absolute payoﬀ would not pursue the maximization of relative
payoﬀ. Thus, they concluded that the evolutionary equilibrium is stable. In the case when
the ﬁrms that pursue to maximize relative payoﬀ and those that pursue to maximize
absolute payoﬀ to surpass competitors, Alos-Ferrer (2004), Reichmann (2002, 2006) and
Schipper (2005) argued, the industry’s production is determined between the range of
Cournot equilibrium and Walrasian equilibrium output. If the public and private ﬁrms
coexist in a simultaneous-move game, however, Alos-Ferrer (2004) and Reichmann (2002,
2006)’s equilibrium would not be obtained.
Our result derives from the fact that in the mixed oligopoly, the relative-payoﬀ-
maximizer of the private ﬁrm has a dominant strategy. In this regard, whether the
public ﬁrm is payoﬀ maximizer or not, the best payoﬀ maximizer for the private ﬁrm is
the absolute-payoﬀ-maximizer. Therefore, investigating the sequential-move game in the
mixed oligopoly is needed for future research5.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate the simultaneous-move game in a mixed duopoly where ﬁrms
are maximizers of either proﬁts or relative proﬁts. Contrary to previous results, if each ﬁrm
has mixed motives about payoﬀ in a simultaneous-move game, a private ﬁrm monopolizes
whereas the public ﬁrm’s amount of production becomes zero. However, our result might
depend on the assumption that common marginal cost is constant regardless of who
5For the sequential-move games in the mixed duopoly, it is available from author upon request.
5produces the output in mixed duopoly. Thus, extending our formulation to encompass a
diﬀerent marginal cost and endogenous the number of entry ﬁrms are further subjects for
future research.
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